Federalist papers 51

Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States.The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State.The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union For the Independent Journal.

In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government.By NECESSITATING a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures.

The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable.No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language.Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature.To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit.Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen.

It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government.Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other.A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other objects.

This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts.Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other.The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place.The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.If the interposition of the State legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated.How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment.Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some other quarter.There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution.The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this particular.

This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies.At present some of the States are little more than a society of husbandmen.Author: Alexander Hamilton To the People of the State of New York: IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union.Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people.A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model before them.

In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States.For example, the English king acts in a legislative capacity when he enters into treaties with foreign sovereigns: once treaties are signed they have the force of legislative acts.The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights.This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt that the supposed ABOLITION of the trial by jury, by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue.If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption.

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Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body.Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions.

Kerby Anderson takes through a summary of the Federalist Papers as seen from a biblical worldview perspective.If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year.The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.